In the community medical Internet of Things (IoT) environment, there exist a large number of device nodes, network nodes and user nodes which form a heterogeneous network. In order to ensure smooth data exchange, some gateway nodes are adopted to connect different network spaces. Therefore, how to identify and authenticate the identities of heterogeneous nodes is an urgent problem to be solved. In this paper, we start with node security identity authentication, make uses of the mechanism of elliptic curve encryption algorithm signature and session key symmetric encryption, design an efficient community medical IoT node secure two-way identity authentication method, and propose a secure and reliable update mechanism for the update of authentication keys and session keys. These measures can effectively ensure the legality of nodes and communication security in the community medical IoT system. Through the analysis and comparison of experimental performance, this scheme is more suitable for the scene of community medical Internet of Things.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the Internet of Things (IoT) [1] , cloud computing [2] , big data, smart cities, and smart medical technologies [3] has brought great convenience to people's lives, especially in the field of medical applications. As a result, the forms of medical treatment are becoming increasingly diverse, such as remote diagnosis, mobile registration, personal health wear device, and so on, which has greatly promoted the development of medical care and brought great convenience to people's healthy lives. It has greatly improved the efficiency of patient treatment and optimized the allocation of medical resources. A large number of IoT devices are applied to the medical field to generate massive personal health information including personal key privacy information, which was transferred and stored in medical IoT systems.
The Community Medical Internet of Things (CMIoT) is an important application of the IoT in the medical and health
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field, which greatly promotes the development of people's health, and also faces various threats of the IoT space. The CMIoT system is constantly facing a large number of cybercriminal node attack threats in a public network environment, which causes leakage of patient privacy information [4] .
In the CMIoT system structure, there are multiple types of nodes, which can be divided into terminal nodes and network nodes according to the structure level of the IoT. The terminal nodes include mobile terminals (user terminals), clouds (health data storage), and health device terminals (various types of data-aware sensors), intermediate nodes (including heterogeneous network switching nodes, routing/transport nodes). In this public network environment, personal health data information is transmitted to the cloud node by the health device node in the system network, and the illegal nodes can easily join the network and steal personal privacy.
In the complex environment of the IoT, the identity (ID) authentication is needed among multiple heterogeneous networks, multiple types of node users, and different user systems (cloud nodes, mobile terminals, intermediate nodes, and terminal nodes). The complexity of the IoT environment has higher requirements for its node authentication policy. The common identity authentication strategy is used to complete identity authentication between two nodes. The number of nodes in the Internet of Things is large. When a large number of nodes are authenticated, a large number of calculations are made. In order to reduce the computational cost of IoT identity authentication and ensure the legality of node identity, this paper designs an efficient community medical IoT identity authentication method to complete secure two-party node identity authentication.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the related work of identity authentication, related definitions and symbolic descriptions. Section III proposes the basic process of two-party identity authentication and the methods of secure two-party identity authentication and node identity authentication. Section IV analyzes and evaluates the security of the proposed identity authentication. Section V We proved and analyzed the experiment in this paper. Finally, we summarize the work and prospects for future work.
II. RELATED WORKS A. OVERVIEW
The most widely used authentication system is Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) system [13] . It usually includes Certificate Authority (CA), Registration Authority (RA), certificate publishing system, PKI policy, software and hardware systems, etc. One of its important goals is to verify the legality of user authentication. According to security elements, authentication protocols can be classified into three categories [6] - [12] .
-Password based authentication protocol. It confirms user identity through specific information such as password and Personal Identification Number (PIN) code. -Token authentication strategy. It uses common IC card, smart Card, USB key, digital certificate and so on to confirm specific users ID. -Biometric recognition. It confirms the identity of users according to the uniqueness of some special parts of the organism, such as fingerprint, iris and face. Single identity authentication protocol is vulnerable to identity information disclosure, password missing, smart card loss, network attacks. With the increasing demand for security in cyberspace, a more secure authentication protocol is often designed by combining multiple security elements. And almost all authentication protocols are built on a cryptographic algorithm.
In the early days, the common form of identity authentication was one-way password authentication mechanism. For example, hash algorithms were used to ensure password security, while RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) algorithms were used to sign password. It has the limitation of one-way authentication, and it also faces many threats of password attack [5] . Subsequently, the authentication mechanism based on public key encryption algorithm has been widely studied and applied. For example, ELGamal public key cryptography algorithm and RSA public key algorithm combined with smart card strategy were used to design the two-way identity authentication mechanism, and met certain requirements for safety purposes. However these are all built on high computing resources [6] , [7] . Since 2010, IoT technology applications and mobile phone applications have been popularized rapidly, and greatly enriched the number of network users and user types. At the same time, IoT nodes have limitations of computing power and power supply energy, which seriously restrict the universality of traditional authentication mechanism. Therefore, based on different lightweight security mechanisms (such as elliptic curve cryptography, ECC), many lightweight/efficient authentication mechanisms have been proposed. Yang and Zhou [8] , Niu and Li [9] , Reddy et al. [10] proposed different authentication mechanisms for node authentication in the IoT environment, such as authentication mechanism based on node geographic location,'' biometric + ECC'' hybrid security mechanism, ID anonymous authentication strategy, etc. These authentication mechanisms not only have strong specificity, but also have some security problems or high computational cost defects, and it is difficult to meet the actual scene needs of the medical IoT.
B. COMMONLY USED IDENTITY AUTHENTICATION TECHNOLOGIES
Identity authentication is an effective method to verify the legality of device identity. Common identity authentication methods include passwords, biometrics, smart cards, etc. Different application scenarios have different identity authentication mechanisms. At present, many IoT health devices are mainly biased towards smart medical data collection. Few researchers focus on the identity security of devices.
1) PASSWORD AUTHENTICATION
The password authentication mechanism is the most commonly used authentication method in the user information management system, that is, the authentication method in the form of {UserName, PassWord}. UserName (UN) is the user ID, which is set up by users when they register with the management center or service center. UN is used to identify identity, composed of strings of certain length, and can't contain illegal characters. PassWord (PW) is the password for users to login to a certain system. PW is stored in the specified string random sequence and is set up at the UN registration stage and can be modified by the legal user. It is a one-way identity authentication process [11] . The system model includes clients and a server. The authentication process includes the UN/PW registration phase and the authentication phase, as shown in Figure 1 . Password authentication is widely used in the Internet network space. The Internet network space is a public computer network space, which has massive users including many lawbreakers, hackers and so on inside the space. Therefore, Internet is faced with threats of various types of network attacks such as weak password attack, brute force attack and so on. So that it is easy to divulge user passwords. Researchers often use a variety of secure encryption algorithms to ensure the security of user passwords [6] , [12] , [13] , such as one-way computing (Hash functions), symmetric encryption algorithms and asymmetric encryption algorithms.
2) SMART CARD IDENTITY AUTHENTICATION
A smart card, is a plastic card that houses an integrated chip with I/O, storage, and processing capabilities including identification smart cards (such as bus cards, campus cards, employee cards, bank cards, etc.) and computing smart cards (such as electronic passwords, dongle, USB key, etc.). The identification smart cards and card readers (RFID) enable people to step into smart life step by step. For example, the use of campus cards simplifies the operation process of cash checkout, and the use of access cards increases the legitimacy of users. The computing smart cards can quickly complete the relevant encryption/decryption calculations and the generation of related keys, e.g., the electronic cipher generates a security verification code. Compared with the software security encryption, the smart card chip is more faster in encryption and decryption, more secure and more reliable.
With the development of Internet technology, smart cards have become more and more widely used and diversified. Two dimensional code technology (Quick Response code, QR) is an advanced form of smart card. The QR code recognition technology of mobile phones replaces the reader equipments of special smart cards, and promotes the development of smart card technology. Especially with the popularity of mobile phone scanning payment, smart card applications more reflects the diversity, importance and security. The using process is shown in Figure 2 .
3) BIOMETRIC IDENTITY AUTHENTICATION
Biometric information-based identity authentication is a process of identifying user IDs with the uniqueness of biometric information digitization and the unforgeability of biometrics, and completing the authentication process of user identification. Its main feature is the collection of biological information used for identity. The certified biological information includes fingerprint, iris, voiceprint, palm print, and other biological information.
The biometric information authentication process can be divided into two stages, as shown in Figure 3 . The first stage is biological information collection. For example, the fingerprint biometric information is transformed into digital information by using fingerprint acquisition equipment, and the digital information is stored in the service center through network transmission equipment. This process is consistent with the user authentication stage of password authentication. The second stage is identity authentication. Firstly, the fingerprint information is transformed into digital information, and then matched with the digital information stored in the service center. If the matching is successful, the authentication is passed.
In order to improve the security of the system, a variety of combination strategies will be adopted in the actual environment to complete identity authentication, such as password and smart card, password and bio-information, smart card and bio-information combination to complete identity authentication.
C. STATE OF THE ART
The main modes of security solutions for IoT identity authentication can be divided into two types: one is to use trusted third-party services [14] in which the third party provides trusted services to confirm the legality of the request object; the other is the authentication scheme that does not use trusted service center to provide services. Mahalle et al. [15] proposed an access control model based on node permissions. Nodes can access related resources according to their own permissions. This model combines node access control policies to determine node identity legitimacy. Yang and Zhou [8] proposed a geolocation-based identity authentication method. This authentication method uses its number of trusted nodes adjacent to a certain distance to calculate its own credibility. It ignores the privacy protection of the node location information and does not provide the way to deal with attack nodes within a certain range around nodes. Yoon et al. [16] proposed a mobile node identity authentication scheme based on ECC and decryption. However there is a defect of manin-the-middle attack, which easily reveals node information. This is pointed out by Niu and Li [9] and improved to achieve anonymity. The authentication scheme of Niu et al belongs to the authentication mode based on trusted services. At the same time, it adds the operations of node personal information anonymity and increases the security of the authentication policy. However, in the authentication process, the identity of the responding node cannot be proved. Sood [17] proposed a smart card-based dynamic identity authentication protocol. Reddy et al. [10] proposed an identity authentication method based on ECC. Although Reddy and Sood identity authentication methods are more secure, they bring more computational cost. All their authentication schemes are shown in Table 1 .
In order to ensure the validity of identity authentication in CMIoT and reduce the computation cost of node identity authentication, we design a secure and efficient node identity authentication method based on medical Internet of Things environment.
III. ARCHITECTURE OF CMIOT
CMIoT is a three-tier IoT model which includes terminal sensing layer, intermediate transport layer and application processing layer. The terminal sensing layer includes health data sensing equipment, personal wearing equipment and so on. It is responsible for converting the biological signals of human health into digital signals. The intermediate transport layer is a heterogeneous network, including a variety of different protocol network nodes, such as ZigBee nodes, Wi-Fi nodes, gateway nodes, TCP/IP nodes, etc., to complete healthy data transmission. The application processing layer mainly deals with health data in the cloud, such as health data storage, diagnostic analysis, access control, etc.
The prototype system includes health data acquisition node, intermediate node, cloud node and user node. In this system, sensor nodes upload health data to the cloud node and mobile user access health data in the cloud node, as shown in Figure 4 .
Nodes (N ) in the CMIoT system includes cloud node (denoted as CN), personal home (including Personal home health device node, denoted as DN), middle nodes such as network transmission and network conversion (denoted as MN), The health data acquisition node DN refers to a health data collection device node (including personal health wearable devices, electronic medical diagnostic devices, etc.), which is composed of health data sensor module and the communication module (e.g. ZigBee), placed in a community hospital or community home, used to complete the health data acquisition, including body temperature, blood pressure, blood oxygen-heart rate and other health data.
The user nodes (denoted as UN) refer to patient user nodes, doctor user nodes, host computer nodes, other user nodes, and middle nodes between users and health devices. Other users refer to users who can only access health data.
The middle node (MN) refers to the node that acts as a personal health information (PHI) route [18] between users and health devices in the actual scenario. In general, it may consist of ZigBee routing node, gateway node, and WiFi node. The ZigBee routing node relies on ZigBee protocol to complete health data transmission. The WiFi node is used to complete data interaction between user nodes and cloud nodes. The gateway node is composed of a ZigBee module and a STM32 module with TCP/IP protocol used to complete the conversion of ZigBee protocol and TCP/IP protocol. Trusted Service Center (denoted as TSC) refers to the node registration center set up by CMIoT, responsible for community medical device registration, distribution, user registration, and key management.
The counter (denoted as c) is used to record the number of authentication requests. If the number of requests exceeds a certain threshold T, the authentication request is rejected. During communicating, c is used to identify the message continuity.
IV. SECURE IDENTITY AUTHENTICATION OF CMIOT A. SYMBOLS
The related symbols involved in the node identity authentication method are described in Table 2 .
B. AUTHENTICATION STRATEGY
In the identity authentication process, on the basis of the tree node distribution structure [20] and related identity authentication model, in order to guarantee the secure transmission of authentication messages, the symmetric encryption strategy with the session key sessionKey is adopted in the communication between nodes that have completed mutual authentication. Assuming that:
-Alice and Bob need to complete the two-way identity Authentication. -Bob is close to the TSC network and has completed the identity authentication with all nodes on the path between Bob and TSC. -With sessionKey, authentication messages are encrypted and securely transmitted between Boband TSC. -And with the related mechanism in the secure two party identity authentication method, the secure communication between Alice and Bob is ensured, as shown Figure 5 , the thicker line connecting the node N with TSC is a secure communication channel, and all the connected nodes have been authenticated. In the CMIoT system, the node authentication is divided into 3 stages-node registration, security identity authentication and security update. The node registration stage includes TSC initialization for key store establishment, user and device record database initialization, UN registration and DN registration. The security identity authentication stage includes the authentication between the device and the user, and the establishment of session keys. The security update stage includes key information update and session key update for devices and users. In the CMIoT environment, UN includes patient users, doctor users, nurse users, and other users. Since these users often use mobile terminals, PC terminals, self-service terminals, etc. as terminals that interact with the network system, UN registration needs to be completed in a communication channel.
As shown in Figure 6 , The UN registration process includes the following steps. Step 1 (The Registration Request UN → TSC): UN randomly generates an ID according to the node attributes, and sends a registration request (ID, Property) to TSC through the secure channel.
Step 2 (The Registration Response TST → UN ): After receiving the registration request from UN, TSC generates x, calculates m = h(ID||x), X = x • p, and randomly selects the key pair {pk, sk} from KS. It randomly generates c T , c T < T , and records the node registration information ID,
Property, {pk, sk}, m, E (•), c T , T in NIS.
Finally it sends the registration information, the related security parameters, secure computing interface E (•) (signature/signature verification interface), h (•) (message digest calculation inter face), and the public key pk T of TSC to UN so as to response the registration request.
Step
(Registration Information Storage): The registration information (ID T , m, X , {pk, sk}, h(•), c T , T , pk T , E(•), g, p)
(such as smart card storage) are securely stored in UN.
c: DN REGISTRATION
The DN registration process is basically similar to the UN registration process. The difference is that:
-If the DN is a gateway device node, when the gateway node has only one information processing module, the DN registration process is the same as the UN registration process;
-If the gateway node is composed of two information processing modules, e.g., A and B, the registration information may need to be stored in both the A module and the B module, as shown in Figure 7 . 
2) SECURE NODE IDENTITY AUTHENTICATION
The secure node identity authentication process is used to complete the secure two-way authentication between the two nodes including Alice and Bob. After a secure communication channel has been established between Bob and TSC, the identity authentication process is shown in Figure 8 . = E pkT (smx T ). If the signature is valid, Bob's identity is legal, and then Alicestores the digital certificate Cert and session key issued by Bob. Otherwise, Bob's identity is illegal, the authentication fails, it needs to return to Step 1, c A = c A + 1, and re-initiate the authentication process. If c A = T , after a certain interval, Alice will regenerates c A , where c A < T , and re-initiate the authentication request.
3) SECURE AND RELIABLE KEY UPDATE
In order to improve the security of the CMIoT system, it is necessary to perform security updates on the nodes that have completed the identity authentication process. The updates include authentication key update and session key update.
a: AUTHENTICATION KEY UPDATE
The authentication key parameters include a key pair {pk, sk}, an ECC encryption/signature algorithm interface E (·) and other related parameters. When the key parameters expire, TSC generates and securely transmits them to UN. The process is as shown in Figure 9 . Assuming that: -UN inputs: sk U , pk T , c TU , Cert U . -TSC inputs: pk U , sk T , c TU , KS, Cert T . The specific steps are as follows:
Step 1: TSC → UN , security update. If the authentication key expires, the new key pair {pk, sk} is randomly selected from the KS and encrypted with UN's public key to generate keymsg = E pkU ({pk, sk}). Here, c TU = c TU + 1, sigmsg = E skT (h(keymsg||c TU )) is signed by TSC, and subsequently (sigmsg, keymsg, c TU , Cert T ) is sent to UN.
Step 2: UN → TSC, security confirmation. After UN receives TSC's security update, c TU = c TU + 1. After the correctness of the counter c TU and the certificate Cert T is verified, UN retrieves the key sk U and the key pk T , and verifies that TSC's signature h(keymsg||c TU ) ? = E pkT (sigmsg). If the verification passes, it decrypts ({pk, sk}||E) = E skU (keymsg).
Finally UN uses the new private key sk to confirm the signature ack = E skU (h(keymsg||(c TU + 1))), and sends it to TSC.
Step 3: TSC updates the authentication key. TSCverifies UN's signature and c TU using UN's new public key. If the verification passes, it updates UN's authentication key in NIS.
b: SESSION KEY UPDATE
Assuming that:
-The session key between Alice and Bob needs to be updated, and the new session key sessionKey 2 is generated using the old session key sessionKey 1 . -Alice inputs: p, old session key sessionKey 1 and c AB .
-Bob inputs: p, old session key sessionKey 1 and c AB . The process is as shown in Figure 10 , and the specific steps are as follows:
Step 1: Alice → Bob: Initiate a session key update. Alice generates a random number q A ∈ Zp * , calculates a partial session key A = q A · p, and sends A to Bob.
Step 2: Bob → Alice: Security response. Bob generates a random number q B ∈ Zp * , calculates a partial session key B = q B ·p, and generates a new session key sessionKey 2 = h(q B · A||sessionKey 1 ), c AB = c AB + 1. Then Bob encrypts (B, c AB ) sessionKey2, and securely responds to Alice.
Step 3 If the verification passes, Alice updates the new session key; otherwise, Step 1 will be performed.
V. ANALYSIS AND EXPERIMENT
To illustrate the rationality of the proposed scheme, some analysis on security and efficiency will be addressed as follows.
A. SECURITY ANALYSIS

Corollary 1 (Signature Security):
Assuming that the user Alice uses the private key sk to sign the message m, denoted as Sig, then other users such as Bobs can only use Alice's public key pk to verify Sig, and can't fake Sig or calculate the private key sk.
Proof: 1) Based on the difficulty problem of discrete logarithm, Sig = E sk (m) = g sk.h(m) −1 .
2) The parameter g and the message digest m are used to calculate g h(m) .
3) Based on the bilinear mapping security, the signature verification can be calculated, E pk (Sig) = e(g sk.h(m) −1 , g h(m) ) = e(g, g) sk .
Since both 1) and 3) are difficult problems, the signature is secure. Based on 2) and 3), the signature is correct.
Corollary 2 (Counting in Order):
Proof: The CMIoT system is a heterogeneous network system, the counter is used to count the number of identity authentication requests. When the number of successive failures of authentication requests reaches a certain threshold, the requested node rejects the subsequent authentication request. In addition, the counter is also used to ensure that the authentication request and the authentication response keeps in order, that is to say, assuming the counting value of the authentication request is c, the counting value of the authentication response is c + 1.
Corollary 3 (Secure Communication): In the authentication process, the communication is a kind of secure communication based on session key encryption.
Its security is related to the length of the session key and the complexity of the encryption algorithm. It is a kind of communication between nodes that have completed node identity authentication (including TSC), e.g., in the identity authentication process of Alice and Bob, before the authentication initiates, Bob and TSC can communicate securely, and after the authentication is completed, Alice and TSC can communicate securely.
Corollary 4 (Legality of Node Identity):
Proof: Based on Corollary 1, Corollary 2, and the trusted authentication service of TSC, the legality of node identity is described as follows.
-Legality of TSC's identity. As a trusted service center, TSC provides security registration services and identity legality authentication services for all new nodes. All nodes requesting to TSCacquiesce that TSC is legal.
-Legality of Alice's identity. TSC verifies the correctness of the anonymous identity AID of Alice, and signs it to Bob to explain Alice's identity legality.
Since the random number In the node registration process, the registration process is completed through the secure communication channel to TSC, and in the same way, the key pair, the trusted credentials, and the related encrypted computing interface are distributed securely. -Security of authentication message. Alice anonymously sends the authentication request toBob. And then Bob transmits the encrypted authentication message to TSC with the session key. Finally, TSC signs and proves Aliceand Bob's identity legality.
-Security of session key. Since the random numbers q A is private to Alice, q B is private to Bob, p is a large prime, A = q A ·p, B = q B ·p, based on the large number decomposition problem, sessionKey = q A · B = q B·A = q A · q B · p, the session key sessionKey is secure.
-Attack suppression.
In the identity authentication process, the signature mechanism is adopted so as to resist illegal node man-in-the middle attacks and false identity attacks. According to Corollary 2, the identity authentication mechanism can resist replay attacks in heterogeneous network systems. In the identity authentication process, if an illegal node sends an authentication request, TSC will refuses to authenticate it. Compared to other identity authentication schemes, the proposed scheme can obtain better performance as shown in Table 3 .
Corollary 6 (Security and Reliability Update): Proof: Both the authentication key and the session key are updated securely.
-The authentication key is updated securely. According to Corollary 3, and the signature mechanism, the update data is transmitted through the secure channel.
And the correctness and security of the response data are verified with TSC signature mechanism. In the authentication key update process, the secure communication and signature mechanism is used to complete the node's authentication key update, and the new key signature verification mechanism ensures the reliability of the authentication key update.
-The session key is updated securely. Based on the difficulty problem of large number decomposition [21] , combined with the old session key and the unidirectionality of Hash (·) calculation, the security and oneway update of the session key are ensured.
B. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
The experimental configuration of the proposed identity authentication scheme in CMIoT is described in Table 4 , where Hash, ECCMod, session key encryption and other calculating resource consumption are shown in Table 5 . In the case of Intel PXA270 processor at 0.624 GHz installed on the Linux personal digital assistant, the ECC signature takes 30.67ms [22] each time.
In the identity authentication process, the participating nodes mainly include Alice, Bob, and TSC. In order to complete the two-way identity authentication between Alice and Bob, the Hash calculation will be performed for 10 times, the ECCMod calculation will be performed for 6 times, the session key encryption will be performed for 4 times, the signature calculation will be performed for 1 time, and the signature verification will be performed for 2 times. The specific calculation consumption in detail is shown in Table 6 .
Compared with other authentication schemes, the calculation consumption is as shown in Table 7 . The comparison results show that the number of signatures cost by the identity authentication scheme proposed in this paper is significantly better than other schemes, where the PMul calculation cost is basically consistent with the Asym calculation [23] . The identity authentication scheme in this paper adopts session key encryption. It is a symmetric encryption mechanism and its encryption calculation cost and signature calculation cost are not on a scale, that is, the encryption calculation cost is much less than the signature calculation consumption.
Assuming that Hash with SHA-1 generates a 160-bit message digest each time, the counter c needs 32 bits, the Cert needs 1024 bits, and the large prime p needs 1024 bits. The communication cost includes 
|(smx
The total cost is 1052 bytes. Compared with other schemes, as shown in Figure 10 , the proposed identity authentication scheme costs less bytes. In addition, it can complete the two way identity legality certificate, which is better than the Yoon et al. [16] and Reddy et al. [10] because they don't make use of digital certificates, and Yoon et al. [16] lacks of the node identity anonymous mechanism.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Aiming at the problem of node identity authentication in CMIoT system, the two-way security identity authentication method is used guarantee the identity security of nodes in CMIoT. Theoretical analysis and experimental analysis show that the scheme is correct, secure and effificient. Under the premise of the same scenario, the proposed scheme can decrease the calculation and communication cost in the authentication process by reducing the number of signatures. It not only can complete the two-way identity legality authentication between nodes, but also generate and update the session key securely. In addition, the smart health network space can be securely constructed through encryption with the session key.
Due to the limited work, the dynamic node identity authentication process is not addressed. In the future work, the dynamic security multi-party identity authentication scheme will be designed. In addition, the experiment only makes part of security verification in mobile user nodes, PC nodes and gateway nodes. In fact, the computing ability, storage capacity, power consumption and other factors of MIoT nodes should be considered within the scope of the scheme. The type and number of nodes in the prototype system are limited.
In practical application scenarios, the number of nodes is huge, the types of nodes are diverse and the capabilities of nodes are different. The security of node authentication ultimately depends on the security of authentication mechanism and encryption algorithm. Future work should be more closely integrated with the actual scenario, considering the upper and lower limits of the capabilities of different IoT nodes, towards a more secure and convenient authentication mechanism direction. On the one hand, lightweight security authentication mechanism can be designed to complete the identity authentication of IoT nodes. On the other hand, we need design a low-power hardware security computing interface based on hardware design, embedding it in the IoT nodes so as to save the computing cost of nodes and increase the security of identity authentication mechanism. CHENG HUANG is currently pursuing the master's degree with Anhui Normal University, China. His research interest includes security of the Internet of Things. VOLUME 7, 2019 
